n.J. BROWN That the pagans did not know af ail the possibility of the beatific VISIOn is historically certain. That they cou/d not have known the possibility in any sense is hardly certain -unless one is prepared to make of the doctrine of the beatific vision a mystery of dogma which is knowable exc/usive/y as revealed. That St. Thomas refused to take so drastic a view of the doctrine is evident from his contention 3 that " ... homo est capax visionis divinae essentiae ... in qua quidem visione perfectam hominis beatitudinem consistere diximus." This view is confirmed by a look at the Prima pars, 12,1 ad 4 ffi , where, in response to the objection of an utter lack of proportion of the creaturely intellect to God, St. Thomas states:
... quaelibet habitudo unius ad aIterum proportio dicitur. Et sic potest esse proportio creaturae ad Deum, inquantum se habet ad ipsum ut effectus ad causam, et ut potentia ad actum. Et secundum hoc, intellectus creatus proportionatus esse potest ad cognoscendum Deum. 4 If one were to disallow the very possibility of any man's seeing God "face to face," it would inevitably follow that man could never attain true happiness -since, as a matter of fact, ail other possible locations for his beatitude have been systematically eliminated as a result of a (strictly rational) course of negative induction. The further conclusion ensues: man's natural desire for perfect happiness must be futile. Aquinas is very far from allowing that possibility:
Vanum enim est quod est ad finem quem non potest consequi. Cum igitur finis hominis sit felicitas, in quam tendit naturale ipsius desiderium, non potest poni felicitas hominis in eo ad quod homo pervenire non potest : alioquin sequeretur quod homo esset in vanum, et naturale eius desiderium esset inane, quod est impossibile. 5 ••• Cum autem impossibile sit naturale desiderium esse inane, quod quidem esset si non esset possibile pervenire ad divinam substantiam intelligendam, quod naturaliter omnes mentes desiderant; necesse est dicere quod possibile sit substantiam Dei videri per intellectum, et a substantiis intellectualibus separatis, et ab animabus nostris. 6 Up to this point and even beyond, e.g. in his consideration of the mode of the beatific vision,? St. Thomas's argumentation is materially philosophical in character.
3. ST 1-11, S,lc. See also 1, 12,1. 1-11, 3,8. 4 . ST 1, 12,1 ad 4m . See also corp. art. : "Dicendum quod, cum unumquodque sit cognoscibile secundum quod est in actu, Deus, qui est actus purus absque omni permixtione potentiae, quantum in se est, maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime cognoscibile in se, alicui intellectui cognoscibile non est, propter excessum intelligibilis supra intellectum ... Hoc igitur attendentes quidam posuerunt quod nullus intellectus creatus essentiam Dei videre potest. Sed hoc inconvenienter dicitur. Cum enim ultima ho minis beatitudo in altissima eius operatione consistat, quae est operatio intellectus, si nunquam essentiam Dei videre potest intellectus creatus, vel nunquam beatitudinem obtinebit, vel in alio eius beatitudo consistet quam in Deo. Quod est alienum a fide. ln ipso enim est ultima perfectio rationalis creaturae, quod est el pnnclplUm essendl; mtantum enim unumquodque perfectum est, inquantum ad suum principium attingit. There are two facts, in particular, which convince him of the spiritual creature's proportion ta the vision of God: "Quod autem homo perfecti boni sit capax ex hoc apparet, quia et eius intellectus apprehendere pote st universale et perfectum bonum, et eius voluntas appetere illud." 8 These data were equally available to the pagan philosophers. Indeed, Aristotle himself felt the weight of such considerations in distinguishing perfect happiness from human happiness and then suggesting that, under appropriate conditions, the latter might approach the former! That he dared not project the possibility of a true and perfect human happiness was not due to any lack of the requisite natural evidences. After ail, Aristotle himself formulated the twin dicta 10 50 mu ch relied upon by Aquinas in the elaboration of his own argumentations: (1) A natural desire cannot be futile. (2) Nature is not lacking in necessary things.
What Aristotle did not see but could have seen was the telie "openness" of spiritual creatures. He could have seen it because, as Dr. Pegis aptly points out, II his doctrine of natures does not de iure exclude the possibility -however much de facto his psychology be grounded in a biological perspective. In the Thomistic perspective, on the other hand, human teleology is caught up almost as a matter of course in the vital matrix of a divine creative causality that is gracious from beginning to end. 12 This fact of creation, of which human beatitude is but the final moment, could have been known to the pagans. So too, the beatific vision in which that beatitude truly and perfectly consists could have been known -not indeed as a possibility ofhuman nature (that would be impossible) but as a possibility for that nature and only in co-operation with the sa me creative decision which brought it out of nothing into firs! act: " ... ita nec deficit (natura) homini in necessariis, quamvis non daret sibi aliquod principium quo posset beatitudinem consequi; hoc enim erat impossibile. Sed dedit ei liberum arbitrium, quo possit converti ad Deuru, qui eum faceret beatum." Il Of course, it remains inescapably the fact that neither Aristotle nor any other pagan did envision even in the most remote and "negative" sense the possibility of any friendship of man with God, of man as an open imago Dei, of God as freely creating man out of nothing for His (and man's) own Good.
The philosophical question involved here is, radically considered, one concerning the power of God -and, it need hardI y be said, the Greeks at their best had but an impoverished natural theology, a woefully inadequate metaphysics (albeit they coufd have had much better ev en without positive reve1ation). Yes, the problem of the possibility of the beatific vision is at bottom a question of the divine omnipotence g. ST I-II, 5, le.
9. ev 1, [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] ; X,7 (!I77a!8).
10. Sec, e.g., De Caelo lI, Il (29Ibl3): "Nature does nothing in vain." De Anima III, 9 (432b2!):
"Nature is not defective in regard to necessary things." Il. A. C. PHiIS, "Nature and Spint: Some Reflections on the Problem of the End of Man," PACPA 23 (1949) Nevertheless, the comparison with the potentiality of matter should not be pushed beyond its analogical utility. St. Thomas is quite clear that the natural desire to see the essence of God is not in spiritual creatures either a mate rial (passive) potency or an operative (active) power. Rather, the imago Dei that is the spiritual creature is ipso facto capable of seeing God in virtue of the infinite openness of its natural appetite. The "natural desire" is the very capacity of the nature, capax naturae. The natural "power," if any, involved here is sui generis. It may with some justification be termed potentia susceptiva naturae: 15 Dicendum quod impossibile est quod per peccatum tollatur totaliter bonum naturae quod est aptitudo vel habilitas naturae rationalis ad gratiam ... Manifestum est autem quod habilitas naturae rationalis ad gratiam est sicut potentiae susceptivae et quod talis habilitas naturam rationalem consequitur in quantum huiusmodi.
Of course, this openness of the very nature is not without a concomitant redundancy into the intellectual powers themselves -as characteristic of the nature. It was this intellectual transcendence that the pagan philosophers could have recognized were it not for their narrowly biological view of the soul and, again, were it not for an entirely inadequate metaphysics. Aquinas admirably brings out the intimate nexus between the transcendence of the created intellect and the metaphysics of existence: Dicendum quod sensus visus, quia omnino materialis est, nullo modo elevari potest ad aliquid immateriale. Sed intellect us noster vel angelicus, quia secundum naturam a materia aliqualiter elevatus est, potest ultra su am naturam per gratiam ad aliquid altius elevari. Et huius signum est, quia vis us nullo modo potest in abstractione cognoscere id quod in concretione cognoscit; nullo enim modo potest percipere naturam, nisi ut hanc. Sed intellectus noster potest in abstractione considerare quod in concretione cognoscit. Etsi enim cognoscat res 14. STI-II, II3,JOc. Just as concerning God the philosophers could have known on the basis of natural reason alone that he is but not what he is, 50 too could they have known the beatific vision but not what it is -since that is irreducible mystery, even to those walking in faith. But before considering this issue further, let us pause to consider certain "inklings" of beatific vision thinking in Aristotelean doctrine.
Q. de Malo

II
The second prong of Prof. Pegis's argument involves the assertion that knowmg the happiness of this life is knowing something that is in no sense ultimate. It seems ta me that, as an interpretation of Thomistic teaching on the subject in general, that assertion is too extreme. In fact, in the very passage 17 under consideration, Aquinas makes two statements serving to picture a sort of incipient beatitudo perfecta, which the divine generosity may lead eventually into the perfect fruition and lasting enjoyment of the beatific vision:
Huius autem ultimae et perfectae felicitatis in hac vita nihil est adeo simile sieut vit a contemplantium veritatem, secundum quod est possibile in hac vita ... Incipit enim contemplatio veritatis in hae vita, sed in futura consummatur: activa vero et civilis vita huius vitae terminos non transcendit.
The image presented, at least as regards the life of contemplation, is clearly one of continuation into consummation rather than abrupt disjunction. -This latter characterization is reserved for the active life, which is indeed contrasted starkly not only with the ultimate happiness in patria but also with its foretaste, the vira contemplativa. This basic theme is deeply characteristic of Thomistic intellectualism 16. ST 1, 12,4 ad 3m. See also SCGllI, 54 (8,9): ..... non difficile est solvere. Divina enim substantia non sic cst extra facultatem crcati intellectus quasi aliquid omnino extraneum ab ipso, sicut est sonus a visu, vel substantia immaterialis a sensu, nam divina substantia est primum intelligibi1e, et totius intellectualis cognitionis principium : sed est extra facultatem intellectus creati sicut excedens virtutem eius, sicut excellentia sensibilium su nt extra facultatem sensus ... Indiget igitur confortari intellectus creatus aliquo divino lumine ad hoc quod divinam essentiam videre possit. Huiusmodi autem lumen intellectum creatum ad Dei visionem exaltat, non propter eius indistantiam a divina substantia, sed propter virtutem quam a Deo sortitur ad talem effectum : licet secundum suum esse a Deo in infinitum distet... Non enim hoc lumen intellectum creatum Deo coniungit secundum esse, sed secundum intelligere solum." Vide c.53 (6): "ilia igitur dispositio qua intellectus crea tus ad intellectualem divinae substantiae visionem cxtollitur, congrue "lux gloriae" dicitur: non propter hoc quod faciat intelligibile in actu, sicut lux intellectus agentis; sed per hoc quod facit intellectum potentem actu intelligere." Especially suggestive in this regard is the following addition to Aristotle: "Solem etsi non videat oculus nycticoracis, videt tamen eum oculus aqUllae." ln Metaph. 11.1 no. 2~6.
17. sec; Ill, 63 (10) . ... participatio beatitudinis potest esse imperfecta dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius obiecti beatitudinis, quod quidem secundum sui essentiam non videtur. Et talis imperfectio tollit rationem verae beatitudinis ... quia, cum beatitudo sit operatio quaedam, ... vera ratio beatitudinis consideratur ex obiecto, quod dat speciem actui, non autem ex subiecto. IY The disparity envisaged by Aquinas as between pagans and Christians with regard to ultimate perfect happiness is therefore a disparity ex parte subiecti. Even here below, that is, Christians have more fully "touched" that beatitude since they journey in hope -"cuius spe dicimur hic beati." 20 Even if one were to restrict one's efforts to the first three books of the Summa Contra Gentiles, any attempt at disengagement of a pure philosophy of human finality must appear as problematic at best, an artificial and arbitrary truncation of theology at worst. That would be true not only with reference to the problems or subjects treated and their systematic unfolding by St. Thomas, but also with reference to the very modus procedendi of the Summa -a method which is consciously and pervasively theological, even in its use of the most profoundly rational philosophical tools. The insight afforded by faith, and the appetitive rectification wrought by hope and charity, are inextricably interwoven in the very texture of the rationally elaborated argumentations for both immortality and, especially, the beatific vision as the one end for man.
ST
Natural knowledge and philosophy may afford us one view (quia) of this one end in the sense of the pure or "negative" possibility of its accomplishment: But it is only the knowledge of faith which provides us with any sure sense of its real, positive, existential possibility -along with sorne limited, enigmatic, sense of its content: "Unde Philosophus, ponens beatitudinem in hac vita, dicit eam imperfectam, post multa concludens, "Beatos autem dicimus ut homines". Sed promittitur nobis a Deo bea titudo perfecta ... " 22
In the Summa Contra Gentiles St. Thomas has expressed the idea more fully:
Fides autem, quae causatur ex gratia, declarat possibilem esse unionem ad Deum secundum perfectam fruitionem, in qua beatitudo consistit. Huius igitur fruitionis desiderium (voluntatis) in ho mine consequitur ex Dei dilectione. Sed desiderium rei alicuius molestat animam desiderantis nisi adsit spes de consequendo. Conveniens igitur fuit ut in hominibus in qui bus Dei dilectio et fides causatur per gratiam, quod etiam causetur spes futurae beatitudinis adipiscendae. 23 The Christian has not, then, a full knowledge of that ultimate happiness as it will be experienced in patria; but what he does have, and what the philosophers neither had nor could have had, is a plenam notitiam in via born of charity, faith and hope. So the radical disparity as between pagan and believer on this point is not a disparity as between the Christian's full grasp of perfect happiness and the philosopher's less than full notice of same. Rather, the distinction intended is one between natural knowledge (speculatio) and supernatural knowledge Ifides and/or contemplatio supernaturalis) -both of which are productive of the fullest knowledge possible in this life in their respective domains. But only the latter knowledge is fully capable of galvanizing the whole person for action directed to the attainment of the one true End.
III
In the light of our answers to the first two issues raised by Prof. Pegis's interpretation, the answer to the final issue, which constitutes the gist of his interpretation, becomes clear. The knowledge of immortality was neither the sole step nor even the major step that was absolutely necessary for the philosophers to have had a plenam notitiam of ultimate felicity. lndeed, Dr. Pegis's own remarks wou Id seem to indicate certain reservations about such an exclusivist interpretation. He writes: 24 The philosophers would still not have known the mystery of the beatific vision, and they wou Id then have been faced with an awesome and almost impenetrable problem, the destiny of an intellectual substance in the afterlife ... 1 venture to suggest that it may weil have been precisely to avoid such an awesome problem that Aristotle contented himself with a consideration of terrestrial beatitude exclusively. We have seen that, as to natural knowledge, he had no metaphysics of existence and divine power sufficient to the establishment of the 22. ST I-Il, 3,2 ad 4"'. Cf. EN 1,10 (1IOIa20). Ill, 153 (3). 24. "St Thomas and the Nicomachean Ethics," p, 10,
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(negative) possibility of the elevation of man, imago et capax Dei, under the aegis of God's omnipotence. Man was not viewed, as it were, sub ratione Dei. Further, and far more decisively, Aristotle had no access to the supernatural knowledge of faith that would have allowed him to see the gracious supernatural complement and fulfillment of man's naturally infinite spiritual openness. This, indeed, is what no mere philosopher could have seen in any event -the aspects of positive promise and real hope that lift man's insatiable natural desire up out of the area of terrible liberty, emptiness and despair.
Yet despite its supernatural fulfillment, the natural dimension is not impaired or overridden:
In operibus Dei non est aliquid frustra, sic ut nec in operibus naturae: hoc enim et natura habet a Deo. Frustra autem aliquid moveretur, nisi posset pervenire ad finem motus. Necessarium est ergo quod id quod natum est moveri ad aliquem finem, sit possibile venire in finem ilium. Sed homo postquam in peccatum cecidit, quandiu status huius vitae durat, remanet in eo aptitudo ut moveatur ad bonum: cui us signa sunt desiderium de bono, et dolor de malo, quae adhuc remanet in homine post peccatum. Est igitur possibilc hominem post peccatum iterum redire ad bonum quod gratia in homine operatur. 25 Amplius. Nulla potentia passiva invenitur in rerum natura quae non possit reduci in actum per aliquam potentiam activam naturalem. Multo igitur minus est aliqua potentia in anima humana quae non sît reducibilis in actum per potentiam activam divinam. Manet autem in anima humana, etiam post peccatum potentia ad bonum: quia per peccatum non tolluntur potentiae naturales, quibus anima ordinatur ad suum bonum. Pote st igitur per divinam potentiam reparari in bono. 26 Here, then, is ample evidence of the perfect reciprocity of natural power and divine power. The problem is not to adduce their metaphysical reconcilability. That the philosophers could have done (but did not). No, the problem in terms of the real attainability of beatitude is to locate spiritual natures in the telic economy of grace. Do the natural powers have any office of their own in the drama of personal conversion? The answer can only be that, just as the creature ex se is nothing as to "its" being (first act), so too the causality of its operation (second act) Îs strictly an instrumental efficiency vis-à-vis the principal efficient causa lit y of the divine omnipotence. "In Him we live and move and have our being." Our productivity, stemming as it does from our having-been-produced ex nihilo in esse, is but the result of the continuing graciousness of that initial gift. What does pertain to human free judgment, however, is the decision to attempt to belong to oneself -to attempt to extract oneself from that unitary order of creation, beatitude and grace. Our resistance, our sins, we can cali our own:
... licet aliquis per motum liberi arbitrii divinam gratiam nec promereri nec advocari possit, pote st tamen seipsum impedire ne eam recipiat... Et cum hoc sit in potestate liberi arbitrii, impedire divinae gratiae receptionem vel non
SeG III, 156 (6).
SCG III, 156 (7).
impedire, non immerito in culpam imputatur ei qui impedimentum praestat gratiae receptioniY This indictment applies even ta those in the state of sin -because of their very sin:
Quamvis autem illi qui in peccato sunt, vitare non possint per propriam potestatem quin impedimentum gratiae ponant, ut ostensum est, nisi auxilio gratiae praeveniantur; nihilo minus tamen hoc eis imputatur ad culpam, quia hiC defectus ex culpa praecedenle in eis relinquitur",2R
But why, after all, should this dependence in the moral order surprise us any more th an the utter dependence of man in the order of being? They are, indeed, correlatives:
... non est ratio inquirenda quare hos convertat et non illos. Hoc enim ex simplici voluntate eius dependet: sicut ex simplici eius voluntate processit quod, wm omnia fierent ex nihilo, quaedam facta sunt aliis digniora". Cum ergo haec auxilia aliquibus subtrahit, pro merito suae actionis, secundum quod eius iustitia exigit, dicitur eos "obdurare" vel "excaecare"". Divina voluntas et providentia est prima causa eorum quae fiunt, nil autem potest esse causa voluntatis et providentiae divinae ... 29
There is about both creation and perfect beatitude (the beatific vision) an irreducible dimension of mystery. The notions are at best only partially rationalizable. Indeed, they are the two terms, ultimately one and the same term, of the continuing creation cycle. Within faith, within theology, it is in fact possible ta achieve a more profound understanding, even in strictly philosophical terms, of these mysteries th an was availab1e to Aristotle and the pagan philosophers. But the aspect of mystery remains -accessible to knowledge only through faith. If a pagan might know (but won't) that man can be immediately united to God as the first intelligible by his own intellect if God so provide, what no pagan can know is that God has in fact sa provided. "The foolishness of God is wiser th an men" in this respect. The believer is instructed now by faith to hope for what he never would have dared hope -even on the firmest metaphysical foundation -since only presumption could have crossed the infinite chasm between the possible and the actual, between the delirious dream and the revealed promise . Thus, far more than a knowledge of immortality and far more than even the most satisfactory metaphysics would have been absolutely necessary to the philosophers' plenam notitiam of ultimate felicity. As pagans without the faith that is the sine qua non of hope in the positive possibility of eternal life, they could not (non potuerunt) have had that full notice.
Dicendum quod fides absolute praecedit spem. Obiectum enim spei est bonum futurum arduum possibile haberi. Ad hoc ergo quod aliquis speret, requiritur quod obiectum spei proponatur ei ut possibile. Obiectum autem spei est uno modo beatitudo aeterna, et alio modo divinum auxilium .... Et utrumque eorum proponitur nobis per fidem, per quam nobis innotescit quod ad vitam aeternam possumus pervenire, et quod ad hoc paratum est nobis divinum auxilium .. Y Without such a plenam notitiam of ultimate happiness Aristotle would have had two fundamental options: (1) He could have considered the "life" of the separated soul in a condition which, on the premisses of his biological psychology, wou Id very probably have seemed much less inviting than the imperfect happiness of this life -if not indeed utterly to be eschewed. (2) He cou Id have concentrated his attention on the human happiness of this Iife -whether or not he deemed the soul immortal (prescinding from the problem). The latter alternative seems in any case to be doser to St. Thomas's interpretation of Aristotelean teaching on this point:
Unde nec felicitas, secundum suam perféctam rationem, potest hominibus adesse: sed aliquid ipsius participant, etiam in hac vita. Et haec videtur fuisse sententia Aristotelis de felicitate. Unde in 1 Ethicorum ... condudit illos quibus talis perfectio in hac vita adest, esse beatos "ut homines," quasi non simpliciter ad felicitatem pertingentes, sed modo humano. 32 It is noteworthy that just prior to this exegesis 3J St. Thomas alludes to the possibility of someone (?) saying that, since happiness is the good for intellectual natures, "perfecta et vera felicitas est illorum in quibus natura intellectualis perfecta invenitur, idest in substantiis separatis ... " This remark, and the immediately ensuing exegesis of Aristotle in the same light, provide, 1 submit, the key to the interpretation of Aquinas's celebrated statement 34 on the narrow perspective of those "praeclara ingenia," i.e. the same pagan philosophers who were unable to have full notice of man's ultimate happiness.
Prof. Pegis has interpreted that passage, too, in the sense of a sub rosa ascription of a definite doctrine of personal mortality to Aristotle by St. Thomas. 35 1 disagree with that exegesis for the following reasons. First, even as to the unaided natural reason, the "narrowness" of the philosopher s' perspective consisted, in Aquinas's 30. 8, 7c . et ad 3 01 • 31. 17, 7c. 32. SCC 111, 48 (9) . EN 1,10 (llOlaI8). 33. Ibid. 34. SCC III, 48 (15) . 35. "St Thomas and the Nicomachean Ethics," pp. 8-9. judgment, rather in their failure to see that the human intellect precisely as intellect is not limited to one mode of knowing than in their failure to envision personal immortality. That the former was, in St. Thomas's view, the major metaphysical shortcoming of the philosophers is borne out by a consideration of what he has to sayon the matter of the perfect intellectual mode of cognition as it exists both in angels and separated souls (SCG II,8I); and also, and even more decisively, by a consideration ofwhat he says in rej!ard to that astounding fact : the quasi-proportionality of created intellect to the divine essence as its prime intelligible. Aquinas's description of the mode of this cognitional union in the beatific vision, and the distinction of existential modes that enables him to reconcile it with the divine transcendence, represents a metaphysical elaboration of the first water -typically Thomistic and entirely foreign to the narrow "substantialist" perspective of the Aristoteleans: But it is precisely this epistemological narrowness which, under the aegis of Christian faith and hope, one may dare to overcome:
... perfecta beatitudo hominis in immediata Dei visione consistit. Posset autem a/icui videri quod homo ad hunc statum nunquam possit pertingere quod intellectus humanus immediate ipsi divinae essentiae uniretur ut intelleetus intelligibili, propter immensam distantiam naturarum ; et sic circa inquisitionem beatitudinis homo tepesceret, ipsa desperatione detentus ... 38 Non enim est contrarium ordini rerum Deum hominem fieri ... Quia quamvis natura divin a in infinitum naturam humanam excedat, tamen homo secundum ordinem suae naturae habet ipsum Deum pro fine, et natus est ei per intellectum uniri; cuius unionis exemplum et documentum quoddam fuit unio Dei ad hominem in persona; servata tamen proprietate utriusque naturae, ut nec excellentiae divinae naturae aliquid deperiret, nec huma na natura per exaltationem aliquam extra terminos suae speciei traheretur. 39 Again, a most valu able conspectus of Aquinas's teaching on the completion of the natural human order via its assumption into, and utter transfiguration by, the su pernatural order -which order is, indeed, natural to God and, by the merey of his grace, rendered natural to man ex via cognitionis. The knowledge of faith, with the Incarnation serving as a sort of exemplar thereunto, not only supplies the deficiency in a pagan metaphysics unable to see the passive possibility of the beatific vision ex parte hominis, but it also attests directly that gracious divine condescension that confers the active possibility (power) ex parte Dei gratiae. The first possibility the philosophers but for their narrow viewpoint could have known; of the second possibility they could not in any case have had full notice. But, in fact, they would not have approached even the first outside of the fortifying context of the second: the realm of The Revelation and of real hope based on the promise. Psychologieally speaking, the plenam notitiam found in that matrix alone could have dispelled the ipsa desperatione detentus. 40 Instead, their metaphysics foundered, and rationality, left to itself, fel! short of its own possibilities (tepesceret). In this sense their very paganism was the ultimate dispositive cause of the philosophers' metaphysical narrowness.
Il has been my objective in this paper to try to indicate that a supposed underlying disagreement on immortality is neither the only nor indeed the best hypothesis for explaining Aquinas's imputation of "narrowness" and a lack of "full notice" to Aristotle and the pagan philosophers. That St. Thomas may in fact have thought that there was no doctrine of personal immortality in Aristotle 1 have no wish to dispute. -M uch less, then, do 1 des ire to enter into the vexed problem of the Aristotelean teaching itself. My pur pose has been a less ambitious one: to otfer an alternative interpretative approach to those key Thomistic texts which Prof. Pegis 50 37. SCG IH, 51 (3), 3X, sec IV, 54 (2). 39, sec IV, 55 (2), 40, sec; IV, 54 (2), 80 construes as to contain an implicit ascription to Aristotle of a definite doctrine of personal mortality.
1 have tried to show that Aquinas may, in those texts, have been concerned with quite other (and perhaps in his mind even more fundamental) deficiencies of Aristotelean doctrine -on both the philosophical and the theological level. 1 have endeavored also to point out how the failure on the latter plane, which was the controlling perspective in St. Thomas's view (consideratio theologi), inevitably redounded into the philosophical sphere proper -to the detriment and narrowing down of metaphysical vision itself. And even on this level of natural reason, 1 have questioned the exegesis of Aquinas that would have him regarding (assuming that he did 50 at ail) the lack of a doctrine of immortality as the really fundamental shortcoming of the Aristotelean psychology. The more basic problem for St. Thomas may weil have been: What epistemological shortsightedness, say, could have precipitated a mortalistic et hi cs ; could have provided its near "occasion," as it were ') And, of course, aside from their metaphysical narrowness Aristotle and the philosophers suffered from an even more lethal debilitation. Not having The Revelation, they could not have got "full notice" of that ultimate happiness of the immediate vision of God as it is promised us and, precisely as so promised by the God-man himself, present to the eyes of faith in aenigmate but known with unshakeable certitude. This inchoatio beatitudinis was beyond the ken of the pagans not only de facto but de iure -and that despite the taste ofultimacy provided by the life of contemplation pure naturalis -since, precisely, the pagans were prevented from experiencing that life in the supernatural setting which begins to complete it, even here below, by hope.
It is important to realize, and 1 have sought to emphasize, the large role played by the virtues of faith and hope in St. Thomas's thinking on the knowledge (notitia) of the supernatural end. The know1edge of that end as something positively attainable must condition de facto the appreciation of man's intellect (and will) as capax Dei in its very nature. Given an adequate metaphysics of existence, of know1edge, and of intellect as such, natural reason alone might establish the capacity of man to see God provided that God were prepared to fortify man 's mind to the task. But even with the best metaphysics that conditional proposition must strik.e the unaided natural reason as so extreme as to be stupefying -to throw reason immediately into retreat, seeking shelter in the imperfect beatitude of this earthly life, "held back by very desperation." Only .the believer can approach such possibilities, now become promises, with confidence.
It is my contention, therefore, that the pervasive consideratio the%gi of Aquinas accounts for his remarks about "the philosophers" in a more economical and coherent fashion than does the immortality hypothesis of Dr. Pegis. However that may be, nevertheless, it is undeniably the case that St. Thomas did intend to tax the pagans, inc!uding Aristotle, with certain metaphysical shortcornings of a purcly philosophical order. 1 have not intended to maintain that Aquinas interpreted Aristotle as holding a clear-cut doctrine of personal immortality. Rather, it is a question of metaphysical priorities. In fact, St. Thomas may weil have intended, at the least, to present Aristotle as not having taken a position on the mater, as having restricted his inquiry in the Ethics to the happiness of the present life. The question then is to know why and how Aquinas, given his statements in chapters 48 and 63 of SCG III, could have interpreted Aristotle in su ch a light. 1 hope 1 have succeeded in indicating the more probable grounds, metaphysical and ultimately theological, for such an interpretation by St. Thomas.
As to the metaphysics involved, Aquinas's emphasis on distinctions of an existential order, and especially his careful epistemological delineation of the beatific vision's constitution, seem to me to militate against the possibility of his having accorded any absolute decisiveness to immortality doctrine by itself. Is it not more likely that he would have seen the "awesome and almost impenetrable problem (of) the destiny of an intellectual substance in the afterlife" as conducing to a certain "posture" vis-à-vis the problem of immortality -rather than vice versa?
